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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 141 
Accident time: 10:45 Accident Date: 20/10/1997 




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
use of shovel (?) 




At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for five years. The victim had attended a revision course 
seven months before and had been on leave 16 days before the accident. The ground being 
worked on was described as medium hard. A photograph showed a dry clay soil with clumps 
of grass. The demining group claimed to have found fragments of the device proving that it 
was a PMN.  
The investigators determined that the victim had got a detector reading, marked it and then 
started to excavate using a shovel and without wearing his helmet and visor. They said that 
during the investigation people pretended the victim has been marking the cleared area when 
the accident occurred but in the original accident report it was mentioned that the accident 
occurred during prodding – the investigators decided that "this is their pretext to confuse 
investigation". 
The Team Leader, Section Leader and the victim's partner all said that the victim was 




The investigators concluded the victim was negligent to use the shovel to investigate the 
detector reading. They decided that he received fatal injuries to his head because he was not 
wearing the safety helmet, and that the Section Leader showed poor command and control. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that no one should prod in the squatting position when the 
ground was suitable for the prone position, that the use of shovels to investigate readings 
should be stopped, and that the command group must stress the need to obey safety 
procedures to the deminers. They further recommended that disciplinary action should be 
taken against the Team Leader, Assistant Team Leader and Section Leader, observing that 
the team had suffered four accidents in as many months. They took this to imply that the poor 
command and control of the command group could be a contributory factor and 
recommended that changes to the command group be made. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 181 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%) Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 














Victim died in a coma 17 hours 15 minutes after accident. See medical report. 
Medical report 
The incident occurred at 10.45 a.m. and the deminer died the next day at 4.00 a.m. in coma. 
The victim’s injuries were summarised as serious injuries to his head, face and hands that 
were fatal: maxila - mandible fracture, head trauma, concussion and compression of skull, left 
humerus fracture, all body superficial wounds. A sketch showed fragment injuries all over the 
body and limbs, with serious wounds to upper left arm, lower face and right side of the head. 
A photograph showed the right side of head as an open wound, lips eyes and nose invisible. 
 
 
The demining group reported to the insurers on 20th October 1997 that the victim (prodding 
without helmet) suffered severe facial injuries, a penetrating wound to his cranium, fracture 
mandible left, fracture left maxilla, fracture left humerus, and fragments to the body. He died 
on the night of 20/21st October 1997. 
A claim was sent to the insurers on 17th November 1997 along with a photograph showing 
severe facial injuries. His injuries were described as half of the face shattered including upper 
and lower jaws, the inside of his nose and right eye destroyed, contusion of brain, superficial 
injury of chest wall.  
A compensation payment of 500,000 Rs [maximum allowable] was awarded on 15th January 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working improperly and his errors were not corrected. The working position (squatting) 
combined with the head and upper body injuries imply that he was leaning forward with his 
head and face in the fragment cone associated with the blast.  
The issue of a shovel for excavation in demining was inappropriate. The secondary cause is 
listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
Bearing in mind the condition of visors in use in Afghanistan, questions over why the victim 
did not wear his helmet and visor would have been appropriate. It is possible that the visor 
was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently during field visits in 1998, 
1999), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment may represent a serious 
management failing.  
The use of the shovel and an upright position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN 
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those 
requirements. The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for 
local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as management failings.  
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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